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Introduction 
Since the start of the rational-expectations revolution in the mid 1970s, macroeconomic 
analysis has been dominated by the assumption of the rational representative agent. This 
assumption has now become the main building block of macroeconomic modeling, so 
much so that macroeconomic models without a microfoundation based on the rationality 
assumption are simply no longer taken seriously. 
The main ingredients of the rational representative agent model are well-known. First, 
the representative agent is assumed to continuously maximize his utility in an 
intertemporal framework. Second, the forecasts made by this agent are rational in the 
sense that they take all available information into account, including the information 
embedded in the structure of the model. This implies that agents do not make systematic 
errors in forecasting future variables. The great attractiveness of the rational-
expectations model is that it imposes consistency between the agent’s forecasts (the 
subjective probability distribution of future variables) and the forecasts generated by the 
model (the objective probability). Third, the model implies that markets are efficient, 
i.e., asset prices (including the exchange rate that will be the focus of our analysis in this 
chapter) reflect all relevant information about the fundamental variables that determine 
the value of the asset. The mechanism that ensures efficiency can be described as 
follows: when rational agents value a particular asset, they compute the fundamental 
value of that asset and price it accordingly. If they obtain new information, they will 
immediately incorporate that information in their valuation of the asset. Failure to 
arbitrage on that new information would imply that they leave profit opportunities 
unexploited. Rational agents will not do this. 
 The efficient-market implication of the model is important because it generates a 
number of predictions that can be tested empirically. The main empirical prediction of 
the rational representative agent model is that changes in the price of an asset must 
reflect unexpected changes (news) of the fundamental variables. The corollary of this 
prediction is that when there is no news about the underlying fundamentals the price 
cannot change. Thus, only if the fundamentals change unexpectedly should one observe 
movements in the asset price. 
This prediction surely must be rejected. In Figure 1, we show the dollar exchange rate 
vis-à-vis the Deutsche mark (in the 1980s) and vis-à-vis the euro (during the late 1990s 
and early 2000s). Since 1980 dollar has been involved in bubble and crash scenarios 
more than half of the time.  News models can only explain this by first a very long series 
of positive news during 1980-85 and 1995-2000 followed by long series of negative 
news (1985-88 and 2000-04). There is just not enough news to do the trick and as shown 
in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2003) during the bubble fase the bad news about the dollar 
was systematicall negelected and during the crash fase the same happened with the good 
news.  
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  Source: De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) 
Not only is there not enough positive and later negative news. Quite often the news and 
the exchange rate move in opposite direction. This is also confirmed by in a study of 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005). These authors looked carefully at a whole series of 
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fundamental variables (inflation differentials, current accounts, output growth) in the 
United States and in the Eurozone and computed an index of news in these 
fundamentals. We show the result of their calculation in Figure 3, together with the 
USD/euro rate during the period 1993–2003.  It is striking to find that there is very little 
movement in the news variable, while the exchange rate is moving wildly around this 
news variable. In addition, quite often the exchange rate moves in the opposite direction 
to that expected if it were driven by fundamental news. For example, it can be seen from 
Figure 3 that during the period 1999–2001 the news about the euro was relatively more 
favorable than the news about the dollar and yet the euro declined spectacularly against 
the dollar. 
 
Figure 3. USD/DM (euro) exchange rate, market and fundamental, 1993–2003. 
 
This lack of correlation between news in the fundamentals and the exchange rate 
movements has been documented in many other studies. For example, using high-
frequency data, Goodhart (1989) and Goodhart and Figliuoli (1991) found that most of 
the time the exchange rate moves when there is no observable news in the fundamental 
economic variables. This result was also confirmed by Faust et al. (2002). Thus, the 
 Dollar-DM/euro exchange rate, market and fundamental, 1993-2003 
 
Source: Ehrmann, M., and Fratzscher, M., Exchange Rates and Fundamentals: New 
Evidence from Real-time Data, forthcoming in Journal of International Money and 
Finance, 2004 
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empirical evidence that we now have is that the exchange rate movements are very much 
disconnected from movements in the fundamentals. 
This finding for the foreign exchange market is consistent with similar findings in the 
stock markets (see Cutler et al. 1988; Shiller 1989; Shleifer 2000). It has led Obstfeld 
and Rogoff to identify this “disconnect puzzle” as the major unexplained empirical 
regularity about the exchange rates (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996). 
There is a need for an alternative approach. Such an alternative approach will be 
presented in this paper. It is based on the idea that agents have a limited capacity for 
understanding and processing the complex available information (bounded rationality, 
Simon(1955)). In order to cope with the uncertainty they use relatively simple 
behavioral rules (heuristics). This does not mean they are irrational. Because the world 
is so complex it is pointless to try to understand its full complexity Rationality in the 
model is introduced by assuming that agents are willing to learn. They follow a 
procedure that allows them to evaluate the simple rules (Brock and Hommes(1997), 
1998)). 
Two learning procedures are possible. One is sstatistical learning (see e;g. Evans and 
Honkapohja(2001); the is fitness learning. We follow the second procedure. In this 
fitness learning agents  compare the rule they currently use to alternative rules.  They 
decide to switch to the alternative if it turns out that this is more profitable. Profitability 
of the rule will be the fitness criterion (Brock and Hommes(1998)). This procedure is 
also a disciplining device: we have to avoid that all simple rules are possible; there must 
be a selection mechanism that only keeps the best rules. In this sense the procedure 
follows an evolutionary dynamics. 
 
1 A behavioral model 
In this section we develop a simple exchange rate model. As will be seen, the model can 
be interpreted more generally as a model describing any risky asset price. The model 
consists of three building blocks. First, utility maximising agents select their optimal 
portfolio using a mean-variance utility framework. Second, these agents make forecasts 
about the future exchange rate based on simple but different rules. In this second 
building block we introduce concepts borrowed from the behavioural finance literature. 
Third, agents evaluate these rules ex-post by comparing their risk-adjusted profitability. 
Thus, the third building block relies on an evolutionary economics. 
 
1.1 The optimal portfolio 
We assume agents of different types i depending on their beliefs about the future 
exchange rate. Each agent can invest in two assets, a domestic asset and foreign assets. 
The agents’ expected utility can be represented by the following equation: 
 6 
t+1 t 
𝑈(𝑊𝑖,𝑡+1) = 𝐸𝑡(𝑊𝑖,𝑡+1) −
1
2
𝜇𝑉𝑖(𝑊𝑖,𝑡+1)    (1) 
 
where Wi ,t+1 is the wealth of agent of type i at time t + 1, Et is the 
expectation operator , µ is the coefficient of risk aversion and Vi represents the 
conditional variance of wealth of agent i. The wealth of agents i is specified as  
follows:  
  
 
𝑊𝑖,𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑟
∗)𝑠𝑡+1𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟)(𝑊𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡)   (2) 
 
where r and r∗  are respectively the domestic and the foreign interest rates 
(which are known with certainty), st+1 is the exchange rate at time t + 1, di,t 
represents the holdings of the foreign assets by agent of type i at time t. Thus, 
the first term on the right-hand side of (2) represents the value of the foreign 
portfolio expressed in domestic currency at time t + 1 while the second term 
represents the value of the domestic portfolio at time t + 1. 
 
Substituting equation (2) into (1) and maximising the utility with respect to di,t 
allows us to derive the standard optimal holding of foreign assets by agents of type i 
 
 
𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =
(1+𝑟∗)𝐸𝑖,𝑡(𝑠𝑡+1)−(1+𝑟
∗)𝑠𝑡
𝜇𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2      (3)
where 𝜎2 = (1 + 𝑟∗)2𝑉𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡+1) 
 
The optimal holding of the foreign asset depends on the expected excess return (corrected 
for risk) of the foreign asset. The market demand for foreign assets at time t is the sum of 
the individual demands, i.e.: 
 
∑ 𝑛𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡       (4) 
 
where ni,t is the number of agents of type i in period t. 
 
Market equilibrium implies that the market demand is equal to the market supply Zt  
which we assume to be exogenous. The market supply arises from the current 
account position, assumed to be exogenous here. Thus, 
𝑍𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡                                                                                          (5)   
    
Substituting the optimal holdings (3) into the market demand (4) and then into the market 
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equilibrium equation (5) and solving for the exchange rate st yields the market clearing 
exchange rate: 
 
𝑠𝑡 = (
1+𝑟∗
1+𝑟
)
1
∑
𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
[∑ 𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝐸𝑡
𝑖
(𝑠𝑡+1)
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2 − Ω𝑡𝑍𝑡]   (6) 
where 
𝑤𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑛𝑖,𝑡
∑ 𝑛𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
Ω𝑡 =
𝜇
(1 + 𝑟∗)∑ 𝑛𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
 
Note that the forecasts Eit are weighted by their respective variances σ2 . When 
agent’s i forecasts have a high variance the weight of this agent in the determination of 
the market exchange rate is reduced. 
 
 
 
1.2 The forecasting rules 
We now specify how agents form their expectations of the future exchange rate and how 
they evaluate the risk of their portfolio. We start with an analysis of the rules agents use in 
forecasting the exchange rate. We take the view that individual agents are overwhelmed by 
the complexity of the informational environment, and therefore use simple rules to make 
forecasts. Here we describe these rules. In the next section we discuss how agents select 
the rules. 
We assume that two types of forecasting rules are used. One is called a 
“fundamentalist” rule, the other a “technical trading” rule. Such a distinction between 
fundamentalists and chartists was first proposed by Frankel and Froot (1987); see also 
De Long et al. (1990). The agents using  a fundamentalist rule, the “fundamentalists”, 
base their forecast on a comparison between the market and the fundamental exchange 
rate, i.e. they forecast the market rate to return to the fundamental rate in the future. In 
this sense they use a negative feedback rule that introduces a mean reverting dynamics in 
the exchange rate. The speed with which the market exchange rate returns to the 
fundamental is assumed to be determined by the speed of adjustment in the goods market 
which is assumed to be in the information set of the fundamentalists (together with the 
fundamental exchange rate itself). Thus, the forecasting rule for the fundamentalists is : 
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𝐸𝑡
𝑓(Δ𝑠𝑡+1) = −𝜓(𝑠𝑡−1 − 𝑠𝑡−1
∗ )      (7) 
where s∗  is the fundamental exchange rate at time t , which is assumed to 
follow a random walk and 0 <ψ  < 1. We assume that the fundamental 
exchange rate is exogenous. 
The timing of the forecasts is important. When fundamentalists forecast the 
future exchange rate they use publicly available information up to period  t − 1. 
This implies that fundamentalists make their forecasts before the market clearing 
exchange rate st has been revealed to them
 . This assumption is in  the logic of 
the model used here in which agents do not know the full model structure. As a 
result, they cannot compute the market clearing exchange rate of time t that will 
be the result of their decisions made in period t . 
 
The timing assumption underlying the agents’ forecasts in (7) allows us to 
derive the market clearing exchange rate in (6) as a unique price for which 
demand equals supply (see Brock and Hommes (1998)). An issue that arises here 
is how this timing assumption can be made consistent with the optimisation 
process described in the previous section. There we assumed that when 
computing their optimal holdings of foreign assets in period t, agents have 
information about the exchange rate in period t. The inconsistency is only 
apparent. The optimal holdings derived in equation (3) can be interpreted as a 
Marshalian demand curve in which an auctioneer announces a price, st. Agents 
then decide on their optimal holdings conditioned on this announced price. The 
auctioneer then collects the bids and oﬀers, and computes the market clearing 
price.  The latter is not in the information set of the agents when they make their 
forecasts for the exchange rate in period t + 1. 
The chartists are assumed to follow a positive feedback rule, i.e. they 
extrapolate past movements of the exchange rate into the future. The chartists’ 
forecast is written as: 
 
 
𝐸𝑐,𝑡(Δ𝑠𝑡+1) = 𝛽 ∑ 𝜌ℎ
𝐻
ℎ=1 Δ𝑠𝑡−ℎ      (8) 
 
Here Ec,t is the forecast made by the chartists using information up to time t−1, 
and β is the coeﬃcient expressing the degree with which chartists extrapolate the 
past change in the exchange rate; we assume that 0 <β < 1 to ensure dynamic 
stability. Thus, the chartists compute a moving average of the past exchange rate 
changes and they extrapolate these changes into the future exchange   rate change Hhange.   
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Thus, technical traders take into account information concerning the 
fundamental exchange rate indirectly, i.e. through the exchange rate itself. In 
addition, technical rules can be interpreted as rules that attempt to detect “market 
sentiments”. In this sense the technical trader rules can be seen as reflecting 
herding behavior (see Mentkhoff(1997, 1998)).  
 
 
1.3 Fitness of the rules 
The next step in our analysis is to specify how agents evaluate the fitness of these 
two forecasting rules. The general idea that we will follow is that agents use one 
of the two rules, compare their (risk adjusted) profitability ex post and then decide 
whether to keep the rule or switch to the other one. Thus, our model is in the logic 
of evolutionary dynamics, in which simple decision rules are selected. These 
rules will continue to be followed if they pass some “fitness” test (profitability 
test). Another way to interpret this is as follows. When great uncertainty exists 
about how the complex world functions, agents use a trial and error strategy. They 
try a particular forecasting rule until they find out that other rules work better. 
Such a trial and error strategy is the best strategy agents can use when cannot 
understand the full complexity of the underlying model. 
In order to implement this idea we use an approach proposed by Brock and 
Hommes(1997) which consists in making the weights of the forecasting rules a 
function of the relative profitability of these rules1, i.e. 
 
 
𝑤𝑐,𝑡 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝛾𝜋𝑐,𝑡
′ ]
𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝛾𝜋𝑐,𝑡
′ ]+𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝛾𝜋𝑓,𝑡
′ ]
                                                                 (9) 
𝑤𝑓,𝑡 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝛾𝜋𝑓,𝑡
′ ]
𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝛾𝜋𝑐,𝑡
′ ]+𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝛾𝜋𝑓,𝑡
′ ]
      (10) 
 
where π’c,t’ and π’f,t’ are  the  risk  adjusted net profits  computed by  technical 
traders and fundamentalists who forecast the exchange rate in period  t  using 
information up to t-1. 
 
Equations (9) and (10) can be interpreted as switching rules. When the risk 
                                                        
1 This specification of the decision rule is often used in discrete choice models. For an application in 
the market for diﬀerentiated products see Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992). The idea has also 
been applied in financial markets, by Brock  and  Hommes (1998)  and by  Lux (1998). 
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t 
adjusted profits of the technical traders’ rule increases relative to the risk adjusted 
net profits of the fundamentalists rule, then the share of agents who switches and 
use technical trader rules in period t increases, and vice versa. This parameter γ 
measures the intensity with which the technical traders and fundamentalists revise 
their forecasting rules. With an increasing γ agents react strongly to the relative 
profitability of the rules. In the limit when γ goes to infinity all agents choose the 
forecasting rule which proves to be more profitable. When γ is equal to zero agents 
are insensitive to the relative profitability of the rules.  In the latter case the fraction 
of technical traders  and fundamentalists is constant and equal to 0.5.  
 
Thus, γ is a measure of inertia in the decision  to switch to the more profitable rule  
As will be seen, this parameter is of great importance in generating bubbles2. 
 
 
2 Stochastic simulation of the model 
Assuming the process of the fundamental exchange rate s∗  as exogenously given, 
the system of the dynamic equations (6) - (10), some of which are high order 
equations, defines a high-dimensional nonlinear discrete- time model (for more 
detail see De Grauwe and Grimaldi(2006). The non-linear structure of our model 
does not allow for a simple analytical solution. As a result we have to use 
numerical simulation methods. One drawback of this approach is that we cannot 
easily derive general conclusions. We will compensate for this drawback in two 
ways: first by presenting sensitivity analyses of the numerical solutions (section 
3), and second by characterizing the steady states within a simplified 
deterministic version of the model (section 4).  
The simulations we perform are stochastic. Stochastic shocks occur in the model 
because the fundamental exchange rate is assumed to be driven by a random walk,  
i.e. 
𝑠𝑡
∗ = 𝑠𝑡−1
∗ + 𝜀𝑡 
 
We will assume that εt is normally distributed with mean equal to 0, and standard 
deviation equal to 0.1. 
We present two examples of stochastic simulations that are quite typical for the 
kind of dynamics predicted by our model (see figure 4). The two upper parts of 
figure 4 present the simulated market and fundamental exchange rates obtained in 
two diﬀerent simulation runs, using the same parameter configurations. The two 
lower parts present the corresponding shares of the chartists. The most striking 
                                                        
2 The psychological literature reveals that there is a lot of evidence of a ”status quo bias” in 
decision making (see Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler(1991). This implies γ < ∞. Thus we set  0 < γ 
< ∞. 
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features of these simulations are the following. First, it appears that the exchange 
rate is very often disconnected from the fundamental exchange rate. This means 
that the market exchange rate follows movements that are dissociated from the 
fundamental rate. This is especially obvious in the first simulation run (left 
panels), where we find that the exchange rate is disconnected from the 
fundamental most of the time. In the right hand panel there are many periods of 
disconnection, but these are less frequent. This leads to a second feature of these 
exchange rate movements. There appear to be two regimes. In one regime the 
exchange rate follows the fundamental exchange rate quite closely. These 
“fundamental regimes” alternate with regimes in which the fundamental does not 
seem to play a role in determining the exchange rate. We will call these “non-
fundamental regimes”. We will also call the latter ones “bubble  regimes”.  The  
nature of the latter can be seen in the lower panels of Figure 4. Non-fundamental 
regimes are characterized with situations in which the chartists’ weights are very 
close to 1. In contrast, fundamental regimes are those during which the chartists 
weights are below 1 and fluctuating significantly. These two regimes appear to 
correspond to two types of equilibria. Thus, a fundamental regime seem to occur 
when the exchange rate stays within the basin of attraction of a fundamental 
equilibrium. In such a regime the exchange rate movements stay very close to the 
fundamental exchange rate. Conversely, a non-fundamental regime seems to occur 
when the exchange rate moves within the basins of attraction around bubble 
equilibria. We will analyse the nature of these two equilibria in more detail in 
section 4. 
We also note from Figure 4 that fundamental and non-fundamental regimes 
alternate in unpredictable ways. The left hand panels show a simulation during 
which bubble regimes tend to dominate, while the right hand panels show a 
simulation during which fundamental regimes are more frequent. The two 
simulations, however, were run with exactly the same parameters. The only 
diﬀerence is the underlying stochastic of the fundamental exchange rate.  
 
3      Sensitivity Analysis 
As mentioned earlier the numerical solutions are sensitive to the parameter 
values chosen. We illustrate this sensitivity by presenting simulations assuming 
diﬀerent parameter values. Figure 5 shows the results of stochastic simulations of 
the model for diﬀerent values of γ. It will be remembered that γ measures the 
sensitivity of the switching rule to risk adjusted profits. Thus when γ is high 
agents react strongly to changing profitabilities of the forecasting rules they have 
been using. Conversely when γ is small they do not let their forecasting rules 
depend much on these relative profitabilities. The results shown in Figure 5 are 
quite remarkable. We find that when γ is high, i.e. when agents  are  very sensitive 
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to the relative profitability of the forecasting rules, the exchange rate tends to 
deviate strongly from the fundamental value most of the time. Thus, when γ is 
high the exchange rate seems to be attracted most of the time by non-fundamental 
equilibria. Conversely, when agents are not very sensitive to relative profitabilities 
(low γ) the exchange rate follows the fundamental rate closely, suggesting that it is 
then attracted by the fundamental equilibrium most of the time. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Prototype simulations in time domain
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Another important parameter in the model is the degree of risk aversion. We performed a similar 
sensitivity analysis and present the results in Figure 6. We observe a remarkable phenomenon. When 
the degree of risk aversion is low the exchange rate remains very close to its fundamental value. As 
the degree of risk aversion µ increases the exchange rate starts to deviate increasingly from its 
fundamental value and the periods of disconnection tend to last longer. This suggests that when risk 
aversion is high the exchange rate seems to be attracted by non-fundamental equilibria. We will 
analyze this phenomenon in greater detail in the next section. Here we briefly discuss the intuition 
behind this result. This can be explained as follows. When agents who use fundamentalist rules are 
very risk avert, they will not be willing to use the profit opportunities that arise during bubbles. For 
example when the exchange rate increases relative to its fundamental, fundamentalists expect to be 
able to make profits in the future from selling the overpriced foreign currency If they are very risk 
avert, they may not be willing to do so. As a result, there is a failure of arbitrage3. This weakens the 
mean reverting forces in the model. 
 
 
                              Figure 5: Sensitivity to switching parameter 
                                                        
3 There are other sources of failure of arbitrage that have been identified in the literature. For example, 
transaction costs or limits to borrowing can be reasons why arbitrage fails (see Shleifer (2000), 
Brunnermeier (2001)). 
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Figure 6: Sensitivity to risk aversion 
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4 Numerical analysis of deterministic dynamics 
 
We now examine the dynamics of the deterministic part of the model, obtained by 
assuming a constant fundamental, which we normalize to zero 
4
. The strong non-
linearities make an analytical study of the model impossible. Therefore, we use 
simulation techniques which we will present in this and the following sections. 
We select “reasonable” values of the parameters, i.e. those that come close to 
empirically observed values. In appendix we present a table with the numerical 
values of the parameters of the model and the lags involved.  
In figure 7 we show the long-run behavior of the exchange rate for different 
initial conditions. On the horizontal axis we set out the different initial 
conditions. These are initial shocks to the exchange rate in the period before 
the simulation is started . The vertical axis shows the fixed-point solutions 
corresponding to these different initial conditions. These were obtained from 
simulating the model over 10000 periods. We found that after such a long 
period the exchange rate had stabilized to a fixed point (a fixed attractor). We 
find numerically two types of fixed point solutions. First, for small 
disturbances in the initial conditions the fixed point solutions coincide with the 
fundamental exchange rate. As mentioned earlier, we call these solutions the 
fundamental equilibria. Second, for large disturbances in the initial conditions, 
the fixed point solutions diverge from the fundamental. These are the non-
fundamental (bubble) equilibria. The larger is the initial shock (the noise) the 
farther the fixed points are removed from the fundamental exchange rate. The 
border between these two types of fixed points is characterised by  
discontinuities.  This has the implication that  in a neighbourhood of the border 
a small change in the initial condition (the noise) can have a large effect on the 
solution. The different nature of these two types of fixed point attractors can 
also be seen from an analysis of the technical traders’ weights that correspond 
to these diﬀerent fixed point attractors. We show these technical traders’ 
weights as a function of the initial conditions in figure 8. 
We find, first, that for small initial disturbances the technical traders’ weight 
converges to 50% of the market. Thus when the exchange rate converges to the 
fundamental rate, the weight of the technical traders and the fundamentalists 
are equal to 50%. For large initial disturbances, however, the technical traders’ 
weight comes close to 1. Thus, when the technical traders take over most of 
the market, the exchange rate converges  to a bubble attractor .   The meaning 
of a bubble attractor can now be understood better. It is an exchange rate 
equilibrium that is reached when the number of fundamentalists has become 
sufficiently small (the number of technical traders has become sufficiently large) 
so as to eliminate the effect of the mean reversion dynamics.  
It is important to see that these bubble attractors are fixed point solutions. Once 
we reach them, the exchange rate is constant. The technical traders’ 
                                                        
4 This is equivalent to interpreting st as the deviation of the market exchange rate from 
the constant fundamental. 
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expectations are then model consistent, i.e. technical traders who extrapolate 
the past movements, forecast no change. At the same time, since the 
fundamentalists have all but left the market, there is no force acting to bring 
back the exchange rate to its fundamental value. Thus two types of equilibria 
exist: a fundamental equilibrium where technical traders and fundamentalists co-
exist, and a bubble equilibrium where the technical traders have almost crowded 
out the fundamentalists. In both cases, the expectations of the agents in the 
model are consistent with the model’s outcome. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: fundamental and bubble equilibria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Chartist weights 
 
 
5 Sensitivity analysis of deterministic model 
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In this section we perform a sensitivity analysis of the deterministic model. This 
will allow us to describe how the space of fundamental and bubble equilibria is 
affected by different values of the parameters of the model. In this section we 
concentrate on three parameters, i.e.µ, (the coefficient of risk aversion), β (the 
extrapolation parameter of technical traders) and γ (the sensitivity of technical 
traders and fundamentalists to relative profitability). 
 
5.1 Sensitivity with respect to β 
We show the result of a sensitivity analysis with respect of β in figure 9,  which 
is a three-dimensional version of figure 7. The attractors (i.e. the fixed point 
solutions of the exchange rate) are shown on the vertical axis. The initial 
conditions are shown on the x-axis and the different values for µ on the z-axis. 
Thus, the two-dimensional figure 7 is a ’slice’ of figure 9 obtained for one 
particular value of β (0.8 in figure 7). 
We observe that for sufficiently low values of β we obtain only fundamental 
equilibria whatever the initial conditions. As β increases the plane which repre- 
sents the collection of the fundamental equilibria narrows. At the same time the 
space taken by the bubble equilibria increases, and these bubble equilibria tend 
to increasingly diverge from the fundamental equilibria. Thus as the 
extrapolation parameter increases, smaller and smaller shocks in the initial 
conditions will push the exchange rate into the space of bubble equilibria. Put 
differently, as β increases, the probability of obtaining a bubble equilibrium 
increases. 
Note also that the boundary between the fundamental and the bubble equi- 
libria is a complex one. The boundary has a fractal dimension.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Sensitivity to β 
 
5.2 Sensitivity  with  respect  to γ 
The parameter γ is equally important in determining whether fundamental or 
bubble equilibria will prevail. We show its importance in figure 10, which 
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presents a similar three-dimensional figure relating the fixed attractors to both 
the ini- tial conditions and the values of γ. We find that for γ =  0 or close to 0, 
all equilibria are fundamental ones. Thus, when agents are not sensitive to 
changing profitability of forecasting rules, the exchange rate will always 
converge to the fundamental equilibrium whatever the initial condition. As γ 
increases, the space of fundamental equilibria shrinks. With suﬃciently high 
values of γ, small initial disturbances (noise) are suﬃcient to push the exchange 
rate into a bubble equilibrium. Put diﬀerently, as γ increases, the probability of 
obtaining a bubble equilibrium increases. Finally, as in the case of β, we also 
observe that the boundary between the bubble and fundamental equilibria is 
complex. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Sensitivity to γ 
 
 
5.3 Sensitivity with respect to µ 
Finally, we study the sensitivity of the equilibria with respect to the coeﬃcient 
of risk aversion, µ. Figure 11 shows the results. We find that when the agents 
become more risk averse the space of fundamental equilibria shrinks while the 
space of non-fundamental equilibria becomes larger. This result forms the basis 
for understanding the stochastic simulations that uncovered that bubbles are 
larger and more likely to occur when agents are more risk averse. The intuition 
can now be understood better. When fundamentalists are willing to take large 
risks they will use the profit opportunities that arise when a bubble develops. As 
a result they will tend to move the exchange back towards the fundamental. This 
reinforces the mean reverting forces in the model thereby eliminating bubbles. 
Conversely, when these fundamentalists are not willing to take risks, they will 
not use the profit opportunities during a bubble.  As a result,  they will not   
sell when the exchange rate is overvalued (or buy when the exchange rate is 
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undervalued), thereby eliminating the mean revering dynamics in the model. 
Thus in this interpretation bubble (non-fundamental) equilibria emerge because 
of a failure to arbitrage which itself is the result of excessive risk aversion from 
the part of fundamentalists. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Sensitivity to µ 
 
6 Why crashes occur 
The model makes clear why bubbles arise in a stochastic environment. It may 
not be clear yet why bubbles are always followed by crashes. Here again shocks 
in the fundamental are of great importance. In order to analyse this issue we 
performed the following experiment. We fixed the initial condition at some value 
(+5) that produces a bubble equilibrium (for a given parameter configuration). 
We then introduced permanent changes in the fundamental value (ranging from -
10 to +10) and computed the attractors for different values of β. We show the 
results of this exercise in figure 12. On the x-axis we show the different fun- 
damental values of the exchange rate, while on the y-axis we have the different 
values of β. The vertical axis shows the attractors (exchange rate solutions). The 
upward sloping plane is the collection of fundamental equilibria. It is upward 
sloping (45%) because an increase in the fundamental rate by say 5 leads to an 
equilibrium exchange rate of 5. For low values of β we always have fundamental 
equilibria. This result matches the results of figure 9 where we found that for 
low β’s all initial conditions lead to a fundamental equilibrium. 
The major finding of figure 12 is that when permanent shocks in the fun- 
damental are small relative to the initial (temporary) shock, (+5) we obtain 
bubble equilibria. The corollary of this result is that when the fundamental 
shock is large enough relative to the noise, we obtain a fundamental equilib- 
rium. Thus if an initial temporary shock has brought the exchange rate in a 
bubble equilibrium, a suﬃciently large fundamental shock will lead to a crash. 
In a stochastic environment in which the fundamental rate is driven by a 
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random walk (permanent shocks), any bubble must at some point crash because 
the attractive forces of the fundamental accumulate over time and overcome the 
temporary dynamics of the bubble. 
The interesting aspect of this result is that the crash occurs irrespective of 
whether the fundamental shock is positive or negative. Since we have a positive 
bubble, it is easy to understand that a negative shock in the fundamental can 
trigger a crash. A positive shock has the same effect though. The reason is   
that a suﬃciently large positive shock in the fundamental makes fundamentalist 
forecasting more profitable, thereby increasing the number of fundamentalists in 
the market and leading to a crash (to the new and higher fundamental rate). Put 
diﬀerently, while in the short run, technical traders exploit the noise to start a 
bubble, in the long run when the fundamental rate inexorably moves in one or 
the other direction, fundamentalists forecasting becomes attractive. 
It is also interesting to note that as β increases, the size of the shocks in the 
fundamental necessary to bring the exchange rate back to its fundamental rate 
increases. In a stochastic environment this means that bubbles will be stronger 
and longerlasting when β increases. 
In conclusion, it is worth noting that shocks in fundamentals both act as 
triggers for the emergence of a bubble and as triggers for its subsequent crash. 
The intuition can be explained as follows. When the exchange rate is in a 
fundamental equilibrium, an unexpected and permanent increase in the 
fundamental, sets in motion an upward movement of the ex- change rate 
towards the new fundamental. This is the result of the action by 
fundamentalists. This upward movement, however, also makes extrapolative 
forecasting (technical trading) increasingly profitable and can lead to a bubble. 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Why crashes occur 
 
 
 
When the exchange rate is in a bubble equilibrium, a large enough (positive or 
negative) shock in the fundamental strenghtens the hand of fundamentalists’ 
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forecasting, and attracts agents towards this forecasting rule. This then leads to a 
crash. 
As in the case of the bubble, the prediction of the timing of the crash is made 
difficult because of the fuzziness (complexity) of the border between bubble and 
fundamental equilibria (figure 12). Thus, although crashes are inevitable, their exact 
timing is unknown. The remarkable aspect of this result is that it is obtained in a 
deterministic model. For further analysis of the implications of the fractal nature of 
the border between fundamental and bubble equilibria see De Grauwe and 
Grimaldi(2006). There it is shown that this feature leads to sensitivity to initial 
conditions.  
 
7  Conclusion 
The world we have modelled is one in which agents do not understand its complexity. 
Therefore they use simple rules of behaviour which they check ex post (fitness 
criterion). This is the way to introduce discipline into the model. In such a world we 
get a very different dynamics compared to rational expectations world.  
We find that there are bubble equilibria that attract the asset prices. They will be 
reached as a result of shocks which makes extrapolating forecasting profitable. It is 
also a world where there is sensitivity to initial conditions, or the importance of trivial 
events (see De Grauwe and Grimaldi(2006) on this).  
Once in a bubble equilibrium one can stay there for a long time … or for a very short 
time. As a result, the exchange rate is disconnected from fundamentals very often. 
This feature has been called one of the main puzzles in the behaviour of exchange 
rates. The behavioural model presented here makes clear that this does not have to be 
a puzzle.  
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Appendix: Numerical values of the parameters used in the base 
simulation 
 
In the following table we present the numerical values of the model. In the first 
column we listed the parameters of the model, in the second column we present 
the numerical values in the base simulations. The last column indicates whether 
or not we have performed a sensitivity analysis on these numerical values. If 
not, we use the same numerical value in all simulations. 
 
 
 
 
